thought has contributed to and in some cases singularly enabled in the 25 years since his early death. Dominick LaCapra has observed that: 'Foucault's History of Madness . . . poses some of the greatest, at times most thought-provoking challenges to disciplinary assumptions and to the projects of reading and writing across the disciplines' (LaCapra, 2000: 185) . If extended to all of Foucault's major works, especially to The Order of Things, Discipline and Punish and The Will to Know (i.e. The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, An Introduction), then LaCapra's claim for Foucault's challenge to our disciplinarity and his provocation to cross disciplines serves as an epigram, or perhaps a motto, for the papers here collected from that conference. For these papers represent a diversity of traditional academic disciplines: philosophy, history, political science, anthropology, art history and dance. Further, they also represent a diversity of cross-disciplinary efforts: philosophical history, historical anthropology, historical political theory, philosophical performance studies, visual philosophy, and so on.
A record of the conference, including a complete audio archive of all of the presentations, is available online.
1 All of the contributors to this special issue presented their work at the conference -the articles collected here being revisions of those presentations. But not all of those who presented at the conference have included their papers in this issue -some of the papers were already promised for publication elsewhere.
2 I shall not here summarize the papers that follow or offer comments expressing my sense of their excellence, as is customary in our contemporary genre of the introduction to an academic collection. I, of course, do find all the articles herein quite excellent, which is as it should be considering that I invited these authors to present at the conference and encouraged them to submit their papers for consideration for inclusion in this special issue. Further, I need not summarize the articles since the interested reader can refer to the summaries offered by the authors themselves in the abstracts included with each piece. Thus breaking protocol from the standard strictures of the genre of the special issue introduction, I prefer instead to offer introductory comments which I hope might foreground the very project, manifest in the articles herein both collectively and distributively, of working with Foucault across the disciplines.
I shall offer here a discussion of meta-critical issues that I think helpfully inform the critical questions taken up in different ways by all of the authors featured herein. The implicit claim of this issue is that there is still much we can learn from Foucault across the disciplines about how to cross the disciplines. In what follows I will make this claim explicit in just one of its many possible terms. I shall focus on the emphasis on contingency that is often rightly taken to be central to the work of Foucault. There are two ways of understanding how Foucault impresses contingency upon his readers. Understanding these two senses of contingency helps us understand why Foucault continues to be one of the most widely cited authors across the humanities and social sciences today. But before turning to the Foucauldian theme of contingency, allow me first to situate what is at stake in a reading of Foucault across the disciplines by recounting a small event from the neighborhood of the conference at which these papers were first gathered.
At any conference such as that from which these articles came there are numerous little episodes that take place outside of the official program presentations and audience discussions where much of the learning takes place. These include conversations randomly overheard at the coffee station, chance encounters with scholars in other fields obsessing over shared problems, or silent discoveries about the particular inflection of a claim when offered in person rather than in print. I would like to relay one little such contingent episode from 'Foucault Across the Disciplines' which most readers of this issue and indeed most conference participants undoubtedly would not have been witness to. For this is an episode which took place on the day before the conference and thus was not part of the conference at all. This episode helps remind us of what is unique about Foucault's dissemination across the disciplines insofar as what is invoked thereby is a dissemination of that particular critical usage of contingency which I shall discuss below.
On the day preceding 'Foucault Across the Disciplines', Frederic Jameson visited the University of California, Santa Cruz. The main public event organized in conjunction with his visit involved a discussion seminar on the first chapter of Jameson's then forthcoming and now published book, Valences of the Dialectic. 3 Jameson remained in Santa Cruz for some days after his seminar and was in attendance at a few (I am not sure exactly how many) of the sessions at the Foucault conference, though he was not able to present at the event. The seminar with Jameson the day prior to the conference was held in a rather cozy setting in the then-new multi-floor Humanities building on campus near Cowell College. The cozy little room, in which many of us sat around a long rectangular table as we often did for lunchtime seminars sponsored by the Center for Cultural Studies, was absolutely packed. The doors were propped open not long after the session got under way so that the growing mass of persons beginning to congregate outside of the room's entrance could hear the conversation, if not participate in it.
The content of the seminar with Jameson was testament to a growing movement in many academic circles to return to the grand (some, myself included, would call them grandiose) theoretical apparatuses of the past, as represented most prominently by the names of Freud and Marx, and the practices of Ideologiekritik that have been bred in their wake. Jameson's invocations of psychoanalysis and historical materialism were by no means old-fashioned, as his book makes clear, but there was in the course of the conversation nonetheless an intensification associated with those theoretical apparatuses. This intensification, of course, has been a quite widespread phenomenon over the last decade, and is not limited to this little episode. But this episode, made dramatic for me by its proximity to the Foucault conference, merely stands in for the contemporary resurrection of Freud and Marx that is under way, and not all that long after Foucault helped us learn to think quite differently. Paul Veyne has made my point as well as I myself might hope to: 'Foucault's importance is precisely that he is not ''doing'' Marx or Freud' (Veyne, 1997 (Veyne, [1978 : 182). Gilles Deleuze, surely a confederate in the 'poststructuralist' dismantling of puffed-up Freudo-Marxism, said of Foucault, 'It is as if finally, something new were emerging in the wake of Marx. . . . Foucault is not content to say that we must rethink certain notions; he does not even say it; he just does it, and in this way proposes new co-ordinates for praxis' (Deleuze, 1988 (Deleuze, [1986 .
One witnesses the renaissance of Freudo-Marxism over the last few decades in the rise to prominence of a range of thinkers who collectively form a rising tide that is perhaps most notable in recent work by Ernesto Laclau and especially the Lacano-Hegelian Slavoj Ž ižek. That Ž ižek has spawned a hip fandom of his own is due in part to the facility of his critical apparatus but it cannot be due to just that alone for his is just one of countless many deep and rigorous philosophical projects on offer today. The renaissance must also have something to do with certain fashionable discontents that find themselves more widely expressed in our culture today; for instance, in the pop psychoanalysis of the Chelsea gallery scene or the Taco Bell Marxism of the gutter punks. Aside from the revival of Freud and Marx in certain high-culture sects and sub-culture scenes, FreudoMarxism is definitely back in swing in the academic enterprise, too. Its revival was certainly a growing current down at Santa Cruz around the time of the Foucault conference.
In striking contrast to the session with Jameson the day before, the names Freud and Marx were barely mentioned at all during the 'Foucault Across the Disciplines' sessions. 4 The fact that a major conference concerning Foucault's work could take place decades after his death without sustained discussion of Freud and Marx is a testament to Foucault's remarkable departure from the theoretical apparatuses that had preceded him. Foucault remains one of our most important and viable alternatives to againfashionable forms of Ideologiekritik purveyed under the names of Freud and Marx, Lacan and Althusser, and most recently Ž ižek and Laclau. In contrast to these massive theoretical apparatuses, which would propose to yield extraordinary explanatory power, Foucault offers us a cautious and skeptical empiricism, according to which the work of thought is a difficult labor, and one that is always stacked up against the heavy weight of the historical past that conditions us. Foucault, unlike Freudo-Marxists, was always clear that we cannot just think our way out of our problems, and yet neither did he give in to the temptation conceding that the work of thought is futile.
The opposition I am drawing here, phrased in somewhat overly polemical tones I confess, raises a crucial question we face today: what are the disadvantages of Ideologiekritik such that genealogy (or some other such method of critical inquiry) might hold greater advantage for us? Allow me to restate this question in its positive form: what are the advantages of genealogy today vis-à-vis the master narratives of Ideologiekritik which dominated critical thought in the past? Those advantages, I want to suggest, have much to do with the way in which genealogy brings contingencies to light as against the reliance on invisible necessities characteristic of Ideologiekritiken. Bringing contingencies to light, however, does not just involve a transcendental reorientation of the relationship between the necessary and the contingent. Rather, I shall suggest, it involves an empirical inquiry into the manifestation of contingencies. This, Foucault's unabashed empiricism, combined as it was with a brilliant philosophical intellect, has much to do with the alternative that Foucault's thought offers us today, across the disciplines.
Contingency across the disciplines
It is commonly thought that the most important contribution of Foucault's philosophicohistorical genealogies consists in the revelation of the sheer contingency of the conditions of the practices which were the objects of his inquiries: Foucault denaturalizes and de-inevitabilizes. It is commonly recognized that there is an enormous critical potential harbored somewhere within these revelations of contingency. If for Kant (and so much of modern thought in his wake, including of course Freudo-Marxism) critique took the form of revealing the necessary limits of thought, then for Foucault (and so much of contemporary thought in his wake) critique has taken the form of explicating the contingency of these very same limits. The contingency that Foucault makes us feel is an important part of understanding how and why his thought facilitates such a wide range of work across such a wide range of disciplines.
I find it useful to distinguish two ways in which Foucault's work mounts the concept of contingency for the purpose of critique. 5 A first sense of contingency in Foucault is well known. Foucault's historico-philosophical practice of course shows us that certain irreducibly central features of our present which we take to be necessary have in fact been contingently constructed. Beyond this, though, there is another sense in which contingency operates in Foucault's work. Foucault not only shows us that heteronormative sexuality, or the author function, or our very sense of modern selfhood are contingent constructs, but Foucault also shows us how these contingencies have been historically composed out of a welter of practices that seem otherwise unrelated. Though analytically separable, these two senses of contingency are often intertwined in Foucault's works, and the result is a provocative and challenging series of critical interventions. Consider each in turn.
Taken in the first sense, Foucault's critical project can be understood in terms of his claims to the effect that our present practices do not have to be as they are such that they could indeed be otherwise. This is now a classic theme in the literature on Foucault and one does not have to wade too far into the waters of criticism to find claims about how Foucault used contingency to unbalance previously accepted notions of naturalness, inevitability and necessity. This aspect of Foucault's critical project establishes numerous important links between his work and that of other major 20th-century philosophers whose work was located in other contexts such as poststructuralism, deconstruction, phenomenology, hermeneutics, psychoanalysis, pragmatism, critical race theory, feminist theory and queer theory. In the broader contexts of this general philosophical motion, Foucault's work effectively generated and reworked a number of important philosophical problems which continue to pose challenges to and difficulties for philosophers 25 years after his death.
Read in terms of the second sense of contingency, Foucault's work involves a quite different deployment of history and philosophy for the purposes of mounting an effective critical apparatus. In this sense, Foucault used genealogy to provide detailed accounts of how our practices have been contingently formed. It is one thing to prove that the present need not be the way that it is. It is another thing to explicate the details of how the present contingently came to be the way that it is. That which makes the historico-philosophical practice of critique that is genealogy unique is largely this how-work, that is, the work of describing how our present practices have been contingently formed. A crucially important point about Foucault's work which is too often overlooked concerns his dedication to describing in lush detail the variety of practices which were contingently fused together in such a way as to form the basis for present problematizations and the practices enabled by these problematizations. Foucault, Paul Veyne recently reminds us, is most certainly an 'empiricist' who offers 'an empirical kind of anthropology with a coherence of its own, the originality of which is founded on a historical critique' (Veyne, 2010 (Veyne, [2008 : 2).
The two central categories in Foucault's practice of empiricist critique are 'practices' and 'problematizations'. 6 Problematizations are formed at the intersection of a congeries of practices and in such a way that stabilized problematizations themselves become platforms for the elaboration of newer practices. Problematizations are made possible by the assembly of practices and in turn these problematizations make further practices possible. According to Foucault's method, that which conditions is also exactly that which is conditioned. Thus Foucault's genealogies are meant to reveal conditioned conditioners which now condition (as problematizations) and are now conditioned (as practices).
Consider as a first example Foucault's work on the emergence of the problematization of modern sexuality (Foucault, 1978 (Foucault, [1976 ). It is one thing to render contingent the longstanding assumption that sexuality necessarily need be consolidated around problems that emerge in the context of heteronormative assumptions. It is another thing to show that this entire problematization of heteronormative sexuality was consolidated around a whole range of seemingly disparate practices which invested heteronormativity with its seeming naturalness and which in turn were themselves invested with an increased heteronormativity. These practices include not only the familiar Victorian strictures over sexual propriety with which we are all familiar, but also the medicalization of the sexual body, the psychiatrization of childhood sexual development and later adult neuroses and psychoses, and the broad-scale normalization of sexual practice itself which continues today to be enforced with severe fervor at the level not only of social pressure but also of legal sanction.
Consider now as a second example Foucault's work on the disciplinary modality of power and its attendant problematization of the interplay of modern freedoms and powers (Foucault, 1977 (Foucault, [1975 ). One intended effect of this work was surely to show that our contemporary practices need not inhabit the disciplinary forms that they do. Discipline is in some senses optional, even if it is clearly not easy to develop alternative options, and even if discipline has its advantages as well as its disadvantages. Foucault's way of showing that discipline is optional was to show how discipline has been contingently made up in such a way as to be potentially revisable. Foucault's work consisted for the most part in rich historical accounts of the formation of disciplinary power in terms of the intersection of a wide range of practical matters that need never have come together: punitive techniques, juridico-legal discourses, breakthroughs in medical and psychiatric knowledges, inheritances of temporal ritual from monastic orders, military techniques of managing space, pressing state exigencies, conditions of factory labor, capital availability, and the list goes on. These various practices (but not only these) intersected and crisscrossed, and not all at once, in order to form the conditions of the possibility of our present disciplinary problematization. 7 The effect of both of these genealogies was to show that the problematizations that condition us in the present are at once entirely contingent and yet enormously constraining. It is crucial to recognize that Foucault's procedure involves an empirical demonstration of contingency in contrast to a transcendental deduction of contingency. The latter procedure is more characteristic of much of the Derridean deconstruction with which Foucauldian genealogy is too often confused. If deconstruction shows us that, necessarily, every necessity is a contingency, then genealogy shows us how some supposed necessity contingently came to be the thing that it is. One thing Foucault had that Derrida never did, at least not in any serious way, was his armature of historical and social scientific inquiries. It is these inquiries, and their empirical traction, that lend credit to Foucault's philosophical theses. Foucauldian critique can thus be seen as subtracting necessity from the very idea of critique itself (a subtraction which Kant, Marx and Freud refused and which later thinkers from Derrida to Laclau and Ž ižek have not managed to make) in order to reinvest critique with contingency -the result is a removal from the transcendental to the empirical (the historical, the anthropological, etc.) as the field in which the inquirer discerns the conditions of the possibility of present modes of being.
One point of Foucault's accounts is to avoid explaining the emergence of our contemporary problematizations and practices in such a way that would credit all-too-common totalizing assertions, for example that 'prisons are the effect of global-capitalist-racistpatriarchy-hegemony'. Such claims, the form of which is instantiated daily on just about every university campus not to mention the other cultural scenes where intellectualism is not unfashionable, paint with too broad a brush to be useful. First, they cannot possibly gain empirical traction since the conceptual armature they invoke is too massive to admit of small-scale empirical application. Second, thus lacking empirical traction, they cannot give rise to effective projects of remaking the empirical realities in which we find ourselves. Nobody, of course, wants to deny that racism, patriarchy, globalization and capitalism exist in such a way as to facilitate soul-crushing forms of subjugation which we should all work to rid ourselves of. What Foucault's accounts have the effect of denying, rather, is that there is a single profound and sinister story to tell about the formation of prisons, sexuality, or madness in the crucible of some dark underbelly of the modern experience. These things emerged onto the scene of history in a way that seems almost completely benign. For that reason, they are all the more dangerous. There is nothing called History, Destiny, or Progress that issued a requirement that such seemingly minor practical endeavors as the daily routines of monks and the search for stable punitive mechanisms ever needed coalesce. But once these things did come together, and once they started working in an increasingly interlocking way, the stage was set for the gradual emergence of truly impressive cultural formations such as discipline and biopower, and once these formations were in place there was no looking back behind them.
But there is, importantly, the possibility of looking forward beyond them, so long as we look through them by understanding the practices and problematizations which form the basis of the present. This helps explain why Foucault wanted to write rich histories of the present which sacrificed none of the complexity of our contingent conditions of possibility. His point in writing about prisons was not merely to mount a criticism of the prison system. His point is better described as providing us with the tools which we might need to begin thinking about ways in which the prison system is problematic and hence capable of being restructured. These tools, as Foucault saw it, were the stuff of empirical accounts of the emergence of prisons. It is in this sense that Foucault's work enables those conducting inquiries in various philosophically informed social sciences capacities to sharpen the critical force of their research -what otherwise may have been merely a history of the formation of the modern English city or merely an anthropology of the modern French police now becomes a tool with enormous critical potential insofar as it provides the material out of which we might begin to rethink how our cities and polices are made up.
It is thus in this second sense of contingency where we best locate the unique critical force of Foucault's work. Foucault's philosophical practice of devoting thought to showing, with both rigor and creativity, how we have been composed into the kind of moderns that we are, opens up a problematization that invites in turn responses as potential means of transformation. Foucault not only shows us that the near future could be otherwise than the present is, but he also provides us with the specific materials which could form the basis for any possible such revision. The first sense of contingency establishes important connections between Foucault's work and the work of philosophers in neighboring traditions. This sense of contingency serves to sever Foucault's thought from the grand totalizing explanations that, Lyotard's classic diagnosis of the postmodern abandonment of meta-narratives notwithstanding, we are still in the thrall of (Lyotard, 1984 (Lyotard, [1979 ). Foucault is here united with a number of other major philosophical impulses of our day against the grand master narratives of the past now experiencing a (perhaps desperate) resurgence. But it is in the second sense of contingency where Foucault's thought can be further distinguished from many of the nearby impulses with which genealogy shares a rejection of totalizing explanations. For those other traditions are often content to show us that the necessary is contingent, that the inevitable could have been otherwise, that the transcendental is immanent, and so on. Foucault shows how these contingencies came to be what they are such that they might become otherwise than we have them.
Foucault's second sense of contingency, invested as it is in the empirical question of how, facilitates linking his work with various other research projects currently under way in the social sciences and humanities. It is this second sense of contingency, in other words, that helps us understand why Foucault's work is unique among contemporary anti-totalizing philosophical approaches in having such reach and mobility across the disciplines. Foucault's influence over the last four decades has been profound. His work now decisively bears on the way in which radically different inquiries across the social sciences and humanities take place. His analytical methods of archaeology and genealogy range widely in their influence and his conceptualizations of power, knowledge and governmentality run deep in their impact. Foucault's work reverberates throughout contemporary academia: it is alive and well in anthropology, sociology, history, literary theory and criticism, feminism, queer theory, critical race theory, ethnic studies, geography, science studies, cinema studies, performance studies, media studies, nearly every other branch of the proliferating tree of various forms of cultural studies, and many other places besides.
The value of Foucault's analytics and concepts for work conducted under the auspices of these diverse disciplinary frameworks stems from a variety of factors. It would require a truly massive intellectual historical research project to adequately describe the many vectors which together contribute to the overall force of Foucault's thought for those conducting inquiry in the context of contemporary research formations in anthropology, sociology, history, literary theory, cultural studies, and elsewhere. Until such time as an ambitious and courageous researcher, or what would more likely be a sprawling network of loosely associated research teams, undertakes such a survey of contemporary intellectual practice and its academic contexts, it may perhaps be provisionally asserted that Foucault's influence stems in large part from the way in which his work constitutes a form of inquiry, simultaneously empirical and conceptual, into certain of our practices that enables us to take up a critical relation to these practices. Foucault helps us to excavate the processes by which our practices have been contingently formed and in so doing he enables us to embark on the difficult labor of reconstructing these practices.
Crossing disciplines
I have singled out two aspects of Foucault's critical work -first, his more philosophical project of demonstrating the contingency that characterizes our historical present and second, his more social scientific project of excavating the history of our present in a way that clarifies just how our present has been contingently formed. It is clear from the foregoing descriptions of these two projects that one of the remarkable advantages of Foucault's work is that in his thought these constitute two inseparable aspects of a single project. While we can heuristically discriminate the philosophical and the historical (or anthropological, or sociological, and so on) elements in Foucault's thought, there is a clear sense in which Foucault's work forces us to go back on this discrimination so as to recognize the complex interplay of these elements. While it is tempting to carve up Foucault's work into the distinctive disciplinary contexts into which we so often force our own work (and there is a very interesting genealogy of this form of intellectual practice which is still waiting to be written) such parsing is ultimately uncongenial to the force and style of Foucault's thought. Foucault forces us to confront the ways in which philosophy and history (and anthropology, and sociology, and so on) intersect one another.
At a certain point every reader of Foucault is bound to realize that these intersections are so tightly woven that it is no longer productive to force Foucault's thought into the narrow, rigid and ultimately stifling cages of whatever disciplinary matrices have been foisted upon us by whatever academic apparatus we happen to be participants in. Dominick LaCapra thus writes of 'the challenge . . . to come more cogently to terms with the demands of cross-disciplinarity that cannot be reduced to mere interdisciplinarity'. He summarizes this crucial distinction as follows:
Cross-disciplinarity is different from additive interdisciplinarity in that it explores problems that cut across existing disciplines, and it may lead to an unsettling and rearticulation of disciplinary lines, possibly even giving rise to newer objects of study and disciplinary formations, or at least to newer emphases, concentrations, and specializations. (LaCapra, 2000: 192) The articles collected in this issue demonstrate the enormous gain in critical potential that can be realized by taking up Foucault's own posture as a cross-disciplinary or counter-disciplinary thinker. One of the signal themes that was established during the conference, and which the articles here clearly ratify, was that what is unique in Foucault's work is its combination of the conceptual and the empirical, or the theoretical and the empirical, or the philosophical and the social scientific. These articles, like Foucault's own thought, are written across philosophy and history, theory and politics, history and psychiatry, philosophy and the arts, and so on. The point of this issue, then, is not just to show the range of Foucault's influence in distinctive disciplinary contexts, but rather to showcase the fecundity of Foucault's thought as it reaches across disciplines in order to straddle multiple disciplines without collapsing them into a monolith all-form that would reduce all thought as superstructural to some final theoretical base.
This issue asserts that Foucault is across the disciplines in at least two ways. He is across the disciplines in the familiar and non-controversial sense that his thought has lit up inquiries in a wide number of the disciplinary matrices populating the modern research university: Foucault figures in philosophy, in literature, in history, in anthropology, in ethnic studies, in education and so on. Foucault is also across the disciplines in that his thinking runs counter to the very disciplinarity that is the condition of his reception in these disciplines. If Foucault figures as a force in literary criticism, it is because he challenges literary criticism to be more historical, or more philosophical, than it has commonly been able to be. If he figures in philosophy, it is because he challenges philosophy to be more empirical than it has been comfortable being. And so on. Foucault's thought is for us undoubtedly conditioned by the disciplinary matrices through which we are able to receive him at all, and yet his thought works, through our thought, to reconfigure these matrices, which is to say that it works to recondition that which is the very condition of its reception. This is what it means to contribute to a conversation. This, exactly, is why we still profit from working through Foucault today.
Notes
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